Al-Zawahiri's letter to al-Zarqawi

Full letter English

Highlights:

al-Zawahiri states Al-Qaeda's objectives to his then Iraq affiliate. The first two objectives are as follows:

"The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq.

The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas, is in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before un-Islamic forces attempt to fill this void, whether those whom the Americans will leave behind them, or those among the un-Islamic forces who will try to jump at taking power."

While Zawahiri appears to underestimate his Iraqi counterpart to whom he is writing, it is significant that the Al-Qaeda leader essentially predicted that the tensions in Iraq following the American's withdraw would present a danger of un-Islamic forces to fill the void, which is essentially exactly what happened when the Shia government immediately began oppressing the Sunni's upon the U.S. troops departure. This set the stage for an extremist group like ISIS to thrive.

On page 4, al-Zawahiri displays his leadership expertise when informing the future ISIS leader the importance of popular support:

"And it's very important that you allow me to elaborate a little here on this issue of popular support...

In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or fearful, and the struggle between the Jihadist elite and the arrogant authorities would be confined to prison dungeons far from the public and the light of day. This is precisely what the secular, apostate forces that are controlling our countries are striving for. These forces don't desire to wipe out the mujahed Islamic movement, rather they are stealthily striving to separate it from the misguided or frightened Muslim masses. Therefore, our planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the mujahed movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them.

The Muslim masses-for many reasons, and this is not the place to discuss it-do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American."

In a way, al-Zawahiri is suggesting that the United States presence in Iraq, while unwelcome, provided a unifying force which aided the group's survival. He describes the American's rule in unifying jihad Muslims in Iraq on the next page.

He writes, "In my opinion-which is limited and which iswhat I see far from the scene-the awakening of the Sunni people in Iraq against the Shia would not have had such strength and toughness were it not for the treason of the Shiaand their collusion with the Americans, and their agreement with them to permit the Americans to occupy Iraq in exchange for the Shia assuming power."

After describing the situation in a way that shows that Al-Qaeda leadership is logical and strategical in their predictions and planning, he goes on to make statements which suggest that Al-Qaeda's methods have the potential to be sustainable.

Careful planning:

"The Americans will exit soon, God willing, and the establishment of a governing authority-as soon as the country is freed from the Americans-does not depend on force alone. Indeed, it's imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in governance and in the Shura council and in promulgating what is allowed and what is not allowed."

He writes of various possible outcomes of his plan, foreseeing potential issues before they arise. He predicts the instability which will follow the U.S. departure and shows that he is willing to compromise in the short term in order to achieve long term goals. This ability is key to establishing a stable state that will stand the test of time.

On the tenth page, he addresses the Iraqi affiliates brutality and beheading, condoning both. He writes, "Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable - also- are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers." This is what ISIS would become following Al-Qaeda's split from their Iraq affiliate, and Zawahiri was doubtful of the capabilities of an army which was built off these brutal images.

Used historical events as guidance:

"We don't want to repeat the mistake of the Taliban, who restricted participation in governance to the students and the people of Qandahar alone. They did not have any representation for the Afghan people in their ruling regime, so the result was that the Afghan people disengaged themselves from them

al-Zawahiri is astute in picking out hints and patterns in Middle Eastern politics that Western nations such as the U.S. could be less likely to focus on due to the significantly different political climates. His ability to understand the region on a deeper level provides another military advantage which he gained through nearly twenty years of experience. His statements display that he is tackling the jihadist objective of establishing a caliphate on a deeper level than ISIS. With little experience and no apparent consideration of the consequences of their violent rise to power, ISIS' rule is likely to be fleeting and unstable.

Al-Zawahiri concludes his letter after inquiring about the well-being of some affiliates and signs:

"Your loving brother"

The fact that this letter was written by the current Al-Qaeda leader to who would become the first leader of ISIS to remind him of Al-Qaeda's primary objective of removing America before a caliphate can be established further supports that Al-Qaeda is the more direct threat to the U.S., and his logical advice which he uses evidence to back up demonstrates Al-Qaeda's strategic superiority over ISIS.